الاتجاه الافتراضي
لتكبير النص لتصغير النص-
تم الحفظ بنجاحהפריט קיים באזור האישישגיאהلحفظ المحتوى الرجاء تسجيل الدخول
معلومات حول الهوية:
أرقام تعريفية أخرى
Wikidata:
Q267508
Library of congress:
sh2007006749
مصادر المعلومات
- Work cat.: Richard, M. Propositional attitudes : an essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them, 1990.
- Encyc. of philosophy, c2006, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007(Two entries: "Propositional Attitudes: Issues in Semantics" and "Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology"; propositional attitudes like knowledge, belief, and assertion play an important foundational role for semantic theory; often cited as the paradigmatic example of this mental state.)
- Sutherland dict. of psychology, 1996(propositional attitude (Philosophy): any proposition expressing an attitude towards some aspect of the world, e.g. a belief, hope, fear, doubt, wish, etc.)
- Concise Routledge encyc. of philosophy, 2000, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007:propositional attitude statements (Propositional attitude statements--statements about our beliefs, desires, hopes and fears--exhibit certain logical peculiarities)
- Stanford encyc. of philosophy, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007(Propositional attitude reports concern the cognitive relations people bear to propositions)
- Blackburn, S. The Oxford dict. of philosophy, 1994(propositional attitudes: the term suggests that knowing what someone believes, etc. is a matter of identifying an abstract object of their thought, rather than understanding his or her orientation towards more worldly objects.)
- The Cambridge dict. of philosophy, 1999(propositional attitude, under proposition: an abstract object said to be that to which a person is related by a belief, desire, or other psychological attitude, typically expressed in language containing a psychological verb ("think," "deny," "doubt," etc. followed by a that-clause. The psychological states in question are called propositional attitudes.)