Language:
שפה נוכחית
Sign in with Google
Sign in with Facebook
The non-identity problem and the ethics of future people
Enlarge text Shrink text- Book
David Boonin presents a new account of the non-identity problem: a puzzle about our obligations to people who do not yet exist. Our actions sometimes have an effect not only on the quality of life that people will enjoy in the future, but on which particular people will exist in the future to enjoy it. In cases where this is so, the combination of certain assumptions that most people seem to accept can yield conclusions that most people seem to reject. Thenon-identity problem has important implications both for ethical theory and for a number of topics in applied ethics, including controversia
| Title |
The non-identity problem and the ethics of future people / David Boonin. |
|---|---|
| Publisher |
Oxford : Oxford University Press |
| Creation Date |
2014 |
| Notes |
Includes index. Includes bibliographical references and index. English |
| Content |
Cover The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People Copyright Dedication Preface Contents (Short Version) Contents (Expanded Version) 1 Five Plausible Premises and One Implausible Conclusion 1.1 What the Problem Is 1.1.1 The Direct Version 1.1.2 The Indirect Version 1.1.3 Same Number Cases and Different Number Cases 1.1.4 Bad Condition Cases and Bad Event Cases 1.1.5 Worseness and Wrongness 1.2 Why the Problem Matters 1.2.1 Practical Applications 1.2.2 Theoretical Implications 1.3 Requirements for Solving the Problem 1.3.1 The Independence Requirement 1.3.2 The Robustness Requirement1.3.3 The Modesty Requirement 2 Rejecting the First Premise 2.1 The Incoherence Objection 2.2 The De Re/De Dicto Objection 2.3 The Metaphysical Objection 2.4 The Equivocation Objection 2.5 The Asymmetry Objection 3 Rejecting the Second Premise 3.1 Non-counterfactual Comparative Accounts of Harm 3.1.1 The Temporal Account 3.1.2 The Moralized Account 3.2 Hybrid Accounts of Harm 3.2.1 The Comparative/Non-comparative Account 3.2.2 The Non-comparative/Comparative Account 3.3 The Non-comparative Account of Harm 3.3.1 Arguments for the Non-comparative Account of Harm3.3.2 Arguments for the Wrongness of Non-comparatively Harming 3.3.2.1 Harman's Defense 3.3.2.2 Shiffrin's Defense 4 Rejecting the Third Premise 4.1 Harming Yourself 4.2 Harming Possible People 5 Rejecting the Fourth Premise 5.1 Rights-based Arguments 5.1.1 The Direct Version 5.1.2 The Indirect Version 5.1.3 The Rights Waiver Argument 5.2 Fairness-based Arguments 5.2.1 The Veil of Ignorance Principle 5.2.1.1 The Actual People Approach 5.2.1.2 The Actual and Possible People Approach 5.2.1.3 The Actual and De Dicto People Approach5.2.2 The Principle of Fair Play 5.2.3 The Principle of Unfair Exploitation 5.3 Respect-based Arguments 5.3.1 Treating a Person as a Mere Means to an End 5.3.2 Treating a Person as You Would Treat All Persons 6 Rejecting the Fifth Premise 6.1 Producing Suboptimal Consequences 6.1.1 The Moderate Principle 6.1.2 The Independence Problem 6.1.2.1 The Argument from Impartiality 6.1.2.2 The Argument from Commonsense Moral Beliefs 6.1.2.3 The Argument from Objections to the Exclusive Version 6.1.3 The Modesty Problem 6.1.3.1 Rescue Cases 6.1.3.2 Creation Cases6.1.3.3 Replacement Cases 6.2 Following a Suboptimal Rule 6.3 Violating a Scope-restricted Optimizing Principle 6.4 Producing an Intrinsically Bad Result 6.5 Wronging a Group 6.6 Acting from a Defective Character 7 Accepting the Conclusion 7.1 Famine Relief Cases 7.2 Rescue Cases 7.3 The Transitivity Argument 7.4 Different Species Cases 7.5 The Three Distinctions Revisited 7.6 Implications 7.7 The Three Requirements Revisited 7.7.1 The Independence Requirement 7.7.2 The Robustness Requirement 7.7.3 The Modesty Requirement 7.7.3.1 The Even More Implausible Conclusion |
| Extent |
1 online resource (321 p.) |
| Language |
English |
| National Library system number |
997010702373505171 |
MARC RECORDS
Have more information? Found a mistake?
